Thursday, March 26, 2015

Why the Post Trial Macinations



In the previous article we looked at how double jeopardy attaches to this case in various ways.  In this article we look at what was behind the post trial machination by the prosecutor and judge—and it wasn’t because they wanted to retry Cameron Brown on the higher charge.  The post trial machinations were necessary to retry him on any charge. 

MOTIVATION BEHIND POST TRIAL MACHINATIONS

When you break it down to the core of the matter, the controversy over the outcome of the second trial comes from the fact that there was no explicit verdict to acquit.  This is what prompted Judge Pastor to declare he was confused. (Trial Transcript, Page 13541, Line 8) Despite the judge’s confusion, it is a fundamental tenet that should a jury unanimously decline to convict—even when the jury fails to formally return a verdict of acquittal—the defendant is nevertheless acquitted because the standard of “guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” has not been met.  This is recognized under case law in California as an “implied acquittal.”

In spite of that, Judge Pastor and Prosecutor Hum insist that there was no verdict.  However, if there truly was no verdict, what motivated the post trial machinations of jury declarations and the judge’s “King’s X” rationale?  The act of collecting declarations attests to the fact that there must have been a verdict—one the prosecutor wished to foreclose against.  And the judge’s King’s X rationale, his omission of some of the facts before him, attests to the fact that the omitted facts reveal that there must have been a verdict.

Even though the jury did not formally return a “not guilty” verdict, they unanimously declined to vote “guilty” after voting on the charge of first degree murder.  There is no functional difference between unanimously voting “not guilty” and unanimously not voting “guilty.”  Therefore, the jury implicitly acquitted Cameron Brown of the charged crime of First Degree Murder.  Retrying him on that charge is a violation of the double jeopardy clause against his rights. 

The prosecutor and judge did not go through those post trial machinations simply because they wanted to retry Cameron Brown for a higher charge.  The indictment of Cameron Brown is very specific.  It does not permit an acquittal of the charged crime of first degree murder, and allow prosecution on the lower included offenses.  Therefore the post trial machinations were necessary for the prosecutor to get another opportunity to try to convict Cameron Brown on any charge. 

This issue is a question of law—and this case reveals a contradiction between the way the law is written and how it’s practiced in California. 

A QUESTION OF LAW

In his opening statements prosecutor Craig Hum declared, “This case is about the murder of a little four-year-old girl, who was killed by her father…The defendant murdered Lauren by taking her on a hike to Inspiration Point in Rancho Palos Verdes and throwing her from a 120-foot cliff into the Pacific Ocean below.” (Trial Transcript, Page 2450, Lines 24-26; Page 2451, Lines 1-4) Yet, when you break it down to the very essence of the evidence, the prosecution presented only two or three witnesses that dealt with actual evidence of whether or not Cameron Brown picked up his daughter and threw her off a cliff.

About fifty witnesses testified for the prosecution, (Trial Transcript, Page 7329, Line 14) yet very little was presented as to what actually occurred on November 8, 2000.  The bulk of the testimony consisted predominately of extreme character assassination and the incessant demonization of Cameron Brown.  The primary function of this testimony was emotional appeal.  In this way prosecutor Hum endeavored to paint a very unfavorable picture of Cameron Brown to make the jury dislike him, so he could get them to convict him of something. (Trial Transcript, Page 7330, Lines13-27) This was the main focus of the prosecution’s case: character assassination with a very scant amount of testimony about their primary theory that Cameron Brown threw his daughter off a cliff. 

However, interwoven into their case was a secondary theory that alleged Cameron Brown intentionally took his daughter to the most dangerous area on top of Inspiration Point and allowed her to run around up there; and there was an implication that he hoped she would fall.  The vast majority of what was presented by the prosecution was in support of this secondary theory. 

The prosecution’s two theories are NOT based on rational inferences from ambiguous evidence that could result in multiple theories.  Their primary, overt theory is very clear; the only way Lauren could have sustained her injuries is if Cameron Brown threw her off the cliff, to the exclusion of any other possibility. (Trail Transcript, Page 9456, Lines 12-14, 17, 18) Their secondary theory is that Cameron Brown allowed Lauren to run around on the most dangerous area on top of Inspiration Point, hoping she would fall.  Their primary and secondary theories are supported by contradictory and mutually exclusive underlying facts, making the two theories inconsistent at their core.  As a result, each theory makes the other one impossible.  Thus, Cameron Brown was tried for two contradictory and mutually exclusive theories about a single event.  Another way one can look at it is that he was tried twice for the same thing, albeit simultaneously, as he was tried for two different, distinct and conflicting theories in one trial; and he was indictment for only one of them.  

THE FUNCTION OF THE PROSECUTION’S TWO THEORIES

The prosecution’s primary theory was the basis to charge Cameron Brown and get an indictment.  It is the theory the prosecution relied on to get them into court.  However, once in court, the main emphasis of the prosecution’s case was on their secondary theory, as they pursued an implied malice theory for second degree murder. 

Their primary theory became a shadow argument.  The prosecution merely gave it lip service, bringing in just a couple of witnesses to support it. 

The bulk of the prosecution’s case was in support of their secondary theory, making it the prosecution’s real case.  This must, at the very least, constitute a Due Process violation against Cameron Brown. 

KEY EVIDENCE PRECLUDES PROSECUTION’S SECONDARY THEORY

For nearly two years Sheriff’s investigators had endeavored to come up with evidence to charge Cameron Brown with murder, to no avail.  After nearly two years of expert shopping, Sheriff’s investigators had come up empty.  That’s when Prosecutor Hum intervened and brought in expert witness Dr. Wilson C. Hayes.  (Trial Transcript, Page 6486, Lines 8-9)

Dr. Hayes concluded that the crime of first degree murder had been committed to the exclusion of all other possibilities. (Trial Transcript, Page 6982, Line 7 to Page 6983, Line 1) He said that by looking at the relationships between Lauren’s injuries, the topography of Inspiration Point, and the laws of physics, (Trial Transcript, Page 6957, Lines 11-16; Page 6959, Lines 13-18) he came to the “inescapable conclusion” that the only possible way Lauren could have sustained her injuries is if she was “launched forcibly from the top of that cliff.” (Trial Transcript, Page 6924, Lines 17-26)  He didn’t say it was just one possibility.  He said that it was a certainty—that it was the only possible way the fall could have occurred.  (Trail Transcript Page 9456, Lines 12-14, 17, 18)

Dr. Hayes documented his conclusions in a report he created on September 12, 2003 for the prosecution.  This report is the single piece of evidence that got this case into court.  Without it there is nothing to indicate that a crime, instead of an accident, was committed. (The ME was only willing to say that Lauren died of blunt force trauma. He was unwilling to call it a homicide based on Lauren’s injuries.  Only by deferring to others did he eventually call it a homicide; Autopsy Report, pages 7-8.  This will be examined in detail in a later post.)

Once in court, prosecutor Hum put very little weight on Dr. Hayes’ conclusions.  Instead he concentrated on his secondary theory that alleges Cameron Brown allowed his daughter to run around on an area that slopes down toward the ocean at the edge of the cliff.  There is no credible evidence to put them there.  Moreover, evidence for their primary theory excludes the possibility that she could have fallen to her death in that matter. (Trial Transcript, Page 6979, Line 25 to Page 6981, Line 1; Page 6982, Lines 21-23)

Nevertheless, once in court prosecutor Hum concentrated on his secondary theory, going for implied malice second degree murder.  He was confident the jury would be instructed on implied malice for second degree murder, due to a requirement for jury instructions on lesser related offenses, and he took advantage of it, despite the fact that it contradicts the evidence used to charge and indict Cameron Brown. In this way he prosecuted Cameron Brown for a theory that contradicts the evidence that got him into court.   

CA SUPREME COURT’S RULINGS ON LESSER INCLUDED / LESSER RELATED OFFENSES

Under California law, “[a] lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater cannot be committed without also committing the lesser.”  The Supreme Court of the State of CA has consistently stated that whether a lesser offense is necessarily included must be based on the statutory elements and the accusatory pleading without regard to the evidentiary presentation. (People v Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 698) The purpose of the rule is to allow the jurors to convict of either the greater or lesser offenses where the evidence might support either.

Despite these rulings, the case against Cameron Brown makes it manifestly evident that this is not how the law is practiced in California.  Even though the evidence used to charge and indict Cameron Brown takes as fact that Lauren was thrown off the cliff to the exclusion of any other possibility; and this makes the prospect for implied malice second degree murder impossible, all the defense attorneys involved believed the law requires jury instructions for second degree murder and involuntary manslaughter.  Furthermore, prosecutor Hum was so confident that he’d have an opportunity to try the case on an implied malice theory for second degree murder, that he built the bulk of his case on it, despite the evidence he used to acquire an indictment.    

Even the jurors, it appears, intuitively knew what the attorneys did not know.  The first legal question they asked was: "Do you have to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he threw her in order to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first or second degree?"  (Trial Transcript, Page 10803, Lines 1-6)

“I think that the very simple answer to that question is no, and that's the only answer that need be given,” Mr. Hum said.  “Certainly, I think all counsel would agree that on implied malice theory for second degree murder, there is certainly no requirement to show that the defendant threw Lauren off the cliff.”  (Trial Transcript, Page 10803, Lines 11-17)

An implied malice theory for second degree murder is in contradiction to the prosecutor’s indictment, and therefore, in contraction to how the CA Supreme Court consistently rules on the matter, yet the prosecutor boldly and confidently advanced an implied malice theory for second degree murder every time the issue came up.   

PROSECUTION’S “EVIDENCE” FOR SECONDARY THEORY DOES NOT MEET STANDARDS FOR INDICTMENT

The prosecution’s secondary theory is that Cameron Brown allowed his daughter to run around on an area that slopes down toward the ocean at the edge of the cliff.  There is no credible evidence to put them there.  Moreover, evidence for their primary theorythe evidence used to get an indictment and get into courtexcludes the possibility that she could have fallen to her death if she had fallen from the sloped area.  (Trial Transcript, Page 6979, Line 25 to Page 6981, Line 1; Page 6982, Lines 21-23)

 The “evidence” used by the prosecution to put them on that slope consists of impressions in the dirt which the crime lab analyst determined were NOT footprints, and statements by several officers, which are all problematic.  The “evidence” used to put them on that slope does not meet the standards to charge and indict Cameron Brown.  The prosecutor made up for lack of credible evidence by constant repetition of the allegation that they were on the slope, thereby causing the jurors to believe it was an established fact. 

A STRATEGY TO EMOTIONALLY MANIPULATE THE JURY

The prosecution’s approach to convince the jury that an implied malice second degree murder offense had taken place was as follows: he appealed to the juror’s emotions throughout the trial; (Trial Transcript, Page 7330, Lines13-27) at the end shocked the jurors’ sensibilities and immediately sent them into the deliberations room. 

Throughout the trial the prosecution’s case was centered on character assassination and the demonization of Cameron Brown, coupled with the constant repetition that Lauren fell from the sloped area at the edge of the cliff.  At the end the jury was taken to the site and shown the sloped area.  Despite the fact that there is no credible evidence that Cameron and Lauren were on that slope, it was presented as an established fact.  The consequence was to shock the jurors’ sensibilities.  Immediately upon shocking them, the jurors were sent to deliberate.

The effect of shocking the jury is revealed by events that happened near the end of deliberations.  On Friday, September 25 the jury indicated they were deadlocked.  Instead of polling them, the Court instructed them to return on Tuesday, September 29 and resume deliberations. On Tuesday morning they submitted a question.  The foreman said, “Most felt until they had an answer to the question they couldn't continue deliberations.”  (Trial Transcript, Page 12319, Line 28 to Page 12320, Line 4)

The trial transcript does not record the question. Instead the Court asked counsel to review it in written form. (Trial Transcript, Page 12301, Lines 18-28) Yet, it is clear from the discussion that followed the question had to do with the site visit and the feelings the site visit generated.  The crux of the question was: are the feelings generated by the site visit evidence. (Trial Transcript, Page 12301 to Page 12308; Page 12335 to Page 12338) The ensuing discussion about the question covered the following points.  These excerpts capture the gist of the discussion regarding the jurors’ question:

“I think the answer is yes,” the prosecutor responded. “I mean the whole purpose of going out to the location was to have them see and understand the area and the dangerousness of the location. And certainly, the dangerousness of the location and their feelings about that is relevant to both the first and the second; and particularly with regard to an implied malice second.”

Defense counsel responded, “What is not evidence, as stated in the jury instruction, is emotions and any emotional feeling or emotional reaction is not to be used.” 

 “I would disagree with that because I think that especially when we are talking about - - again, if we are talking about an implied malice second degree murder, their feelings about the location are important. Their feelings with regard to the dangerousness, their feelings with regard to whether or not the defendant would recognize the danger, all of that is appropriate evidence for them to consider when they are making a determination as to whether or not there was implied malice,” Mr. Hum said. “Their feelings with regard to the location, I think, is appropriate evidence.

“The danger to which Mr. Harris refers is the gut, visceral, emotional response,” the Court said.

And the prosecutor responded, “I guess the problem I have is what feelings about the location that we visited would not be appropriate for them to consider?”

“Well, I think that is -- the jury instruction, I think, is very clear that you are not to bring in emotion in terms of making decision. I think the problem I have with Mr. Hum’s argument is that he is attaching feelings, the phrase "feelings," to … an emotional reaction. That is a feeling that should not be taken into consideration,” defense counsel responded.

“Their emotional response, their visceral response to being out there, is certainly something that they can consider in evaluating the behavior of the defendant,” the prosecutor said.

[Trial transcript, page 12302, line 1 – page 12308, line 12]

After that occurred, the jury deliberated for four more days for an average of 2.5 hours per day.  Prior to that, they had been deliberating for an average of 7 hours per day.  This suggests that after the Court would not accept that they were deadlocked there was a shift in the jury’s frame of mind.  More importantly, this dialogue reveals the weight the prosecutor put on the jurors’ visceral, emotional response to the site visit, and his emphasis on an implied malice second degree murder. 

What is revealed is a strategy that entailed emotionally manipulating the jury throughout the trial, shocking their sensibilities at the end, and immediately sending them into the deliberations room.  This is what was necessary for the prosecution to endeavor to convict on an implied malice second degree murder, since they did not have any real evidence for their secondary theory. After being subjected to such a strategy, it’s no wonder emotion drove the jury’s decisions, not credible evidence presented at trial.   Facts were secondary to feelings in this case. 

This strategy could not withstand a final outcome of not guilty for first degree murder and a hung jury over the lesser uncharged offenses.  Since that was the outcome reported in the court proceedings and recorded in the trial transcript, the post trial machinations were required to give the prosecution another opportunity to try to convict the defendant. 

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